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This chapter seeks to compare and contrast the series of legal cases that were launched by the 
Republic of Cyprus (hereafter, Republic or RoC), both in domestic and international courts, 
in response to the coup d’état and the Turkish military invasion of 1974. An analysis of this 
case law suggests that the RoC reacted to the two events in very different ways: while the 
response to the coup was sporadic and disorganised, the legal action taken against Turkey 
concerning the consequences of the invasion was well-planned and executed. Additionally, 
the ways in which the cases have been subsequently used by the state in order to shape the 
popular narrative concerning the two historical events also differ.1 The tendency discussed 
here – to use the law in order to provide greater or lesser authority to historical claims – is not 
unique to Cyprus. 2  However, the close temporal proximity between the two events in 
question, both taking place in 1974, and the strikingly different responses to them by the state 
make for a particularly interesting comparison. The contrast between these varied state 
reactions offers a partial explanation for why the two events are remembered so differently 
by the Greek Cypriot (henceforth, GC) public: barely in the case of the coup and vividly in 
that of the invasion.  
 
 
2. A varied remembrance of the Cypriot conflicts 
 
On 15 July 1974 a GC paramilitary organisation staged a violent coup d’état against the – 
legitimately elected and very popular – President of the RoC. Since the objective of the coup 
was to unite Cyprus with Greece, which was at the time a right-wing military dictatorship, the 
main victims of the violence were Turkish Cypriots and leftist GC. During the week that 
followed, the President, who had escaped and was being harboured abroad, was replaced by 
Nikolaos Sampson, the owner of a virulent nationalist newspaper and a puppet of the Greek 
junta government (ICG, 2008, p. 1). Sampson’s supporters responded violently against 
anyone opposing the new regime, enforced military curfews on the entire population and 
prevented the publication of oppositional newspapers (Liasi, 1975, p. 564). This illegitimate, 
and largely unpopular, government collapsed 8 days later when Turkey, claiming that the 
coup posed a threat to the survival of the Turkish Cypriot minority, militarily invaded the 
island (Negatigil, 1989). As a result of the Turkish invasion, approximately 165,000 GC have 
been displaced (Global IDP Databse, 2003, p. 6), almost 1,500 went missing3 and thousands 
were killed. Since 1974, Turkey has military, political and economic control over the north of 
the island, with the RoC exercising effective control only in the south (Loizidou, 1997, para. 
56).	
 
These twin events – the coup and the military invasion that followed immediately after – are 
recalled in vastly different ways by the GC population, with the remembrance of the former 
being overshadowed by that of the latter. Debates about the comprehensive settlement of the 
‘Cyprus problem’, the short-hand name given to the invasion and ongoing occupation of the 
island by Turkey, dominate everyday discussions both between politicians and lay people 
(Christophorou et al., 2010, p. 4). These discussions, among GC at least, almost always start 
from the premise that Turkey has illegally invaded Cyprus and that a solution to the Cyprus 
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problem should address and respond to this (Lordos et al., 2009, p. 31). Moreover, the state 
has taken extensive action to remedy victims of the invasion and public events are often 
organised, either in commemoration of the dead or in remembrance of that day.4 The invasion 
is a key theme of the educational curriculum and pictures of the occupied territories appear 
on the front page of all textbooks, together with the slogan ‘I don’t forget’ (Zembylas et al., 
2016). Conversely, there is little, if any, discussion about the coup, with the official state 
policy being one of forgiving and forgetting.5 Part of the reason for these very different ways 
of remembering the two events of 1974 is the contrast between the short duration of the coup, 
with the legitimate government returning to power within days after its violent overthrow, 
and the long-term effects of the invasion, which are still experienced by GC today. Not only 
are the consequences of the invasion more long-term than those of the coup, but they are also 
more extensive. Although these are not wholly accurate,6 according to official statistics, 19 
people died during the coup (Cassia, 2005, p. 73) and 5,000-6,000 during the invasion 
(Cassia, 2005, p. 52). 
 
However, an additional explanation for this one-sided remembrance concerns the way in 
which the RoC has used the law to sanction history by projecting the public’s memories of 
the invasion, while downplaying those of the coup. In particular, the state has influenced the 
way each of the two events is remembered, first, by responding to them through different 
legal procedures and second, by using the outcomes of these procedures in varying ways. On 
the one hand, it has punished the putschists’s actions by criminally prosecuting their leader 
and launching an administrative process that resulted in the (temporary) purging of 62 
individuals from the civil service. On the other, it has been condemning the effects of the 
invasion by resorting to a number of international bodies, most notably the European Court of 
Human Rights (henceforth, ECtHR).7 The RoC’s administrative and legal responses to the 
coup and the invasion – and the effect these have had on the remembrance of each by the GC 
public – are discussed in section 3 of this chapter. 
  
Instead, the remainder of this section focuses on the varying ways in which the state has used 
these legal and administrative decisions in order to shape how the twin events of 1974 are 
remembered. Most notably, the state has disseminated through a wide range of mediums, 
such as school textbooks, the decisions of international bodies that condemn the 
consequences of the invasion (see, for instance, Pantelidou and Hadjicosti, 1992, p. 303). The 
most overt example of this is a section on the website of the RoC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
entitled ‘The Cyprus Question’.8 This section extensively refers to two ECtHR cases, ‘the 
well-known case of Titina Loizidou’, and Cyprus v. Turkey, ‘a case that proved to be of great 
importance for the people of Cyprus and their struggle for the just solution of the Cyprus 
problem.’ The ECtHR’s legal findings in these cases are presented as authoritative pieces of 
evidence for all the allegations made against Turkey and as proof of the fact that the invasion 
was an illegal action under international law. Similarly, GC politicians often use ECtHR 
judgments and UN resolutions as evidence of Turkey’s illegal presence in Cyprus before 
proceeding to argue that any solution to the Cyprus problem should undo the injustices 
caused by the invasion and comply with international law (UN Secretary-General, 2003, para. 
22). 
 
The effects of seminal ECtHR judgments on GC’s perception of history have not been 
researched in much detail; nevertheless, their impact on GC society as a whole is palpable. 
The importance that the state has attached to these legal cases has resulted in the general 
population being fairly familiar with the Court’s main findings, especially in the case of 
Loizidou v. Turkey (Zembylas et al., 2016, p. 26). References to this 1995 judgment were 
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made in the media even as late as 2014 (Hazou, 2014) and public events have been organised 
in honour of Mrs Loizidou.9 Ultimately, the Loizidou judgment, which is discussed in more 
detail in section 3, has become part of the GC’s struggle against the Turkish invasion and 
occupation and a source of pride for them. This is confirmed by the fact that at one point 
approximately 1,400 cases with identical facts to, and having been inspired by, Loizidou had 
been launched by individual GC applicants to the ECtHR (Xenides-Arestis, 2007, para. 38).  
 
Conversely, the use of Court cases or administrative decisions, either directly by the state or  
indirectly by other stakeholders, such as the media, to bolster the public’s remembrance of 
the coup has been non-existent. Sampson’s criminal prosecution and the administrative purge 
of the 62 putschists have received very little mention in legal textbooks and are only rarely 
considered in history textbooks or the popular literature (see, for example, Melides, 2010). 
The coup is almost never discussed in public affairs and even its anniversary tends to be 
overshadowed by commemorations of the Turkish invasion. Moreover, the website of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which so extensively discussed the case law relating to the 
invasion and occupation, makes no reference at all to the coup in its 46-page review of 
Cyprus’ modern history. Unlike the invasion which has resulted in the unanimous 
condemnation by all Greek Cypriot political parties, they – and the media that supports them 
(Papadakis, 2003, p. 256) – have been divided as to how they should respond to the coup. On 
the one hand, right-wind parties, which advocate a strategy of amnesia in relation to the coup 
(President of the Republic, 1991), only organise commemorations of the invasion and view 
the coup as a largely insignificant pretext that Turkey used in order to implement her already 
existing plan to invade the island (Papadakis, 2003). On the other, left-wing parties argue that 
the coup and the invasion are inherently connected and press for the remembrance and 
commemoration of the coup’s victims. Nevertheless, even the communist party, whilst eager 
to blame the right for the coup, rarely mentions the legal proceedings against the putschists 
due to concerns that these will provide support to Turkey’s claim that its military invasion of 
Cyprus was a legitimate way of protecting Turkish Cypriots from the violence that had 
erupted on the island (Cassia, 2005, p. 73).   
 
 
3. Writing history by using the law 
 
Over the years, several ECtHR cases against Turkey have condemned the human rights 
violations that took place on the island as a result of the invasion and ongoing occupation.10 
The leading ECtHR case on this issue is Cyprus v. Turkey, in which the former successfully 
argued that the consequences of the latter’s invasion (among others, mass displacement and 
the continuing lack of access to information about the fate of missing persons) constituted 
violations of human rights. Importantly, this inter-state application to the Court from Cyprus 
against Turkey was in fact, not the first, but the fourth attempt to use the European human 
rights mechanisms in order to showcase the effects of the Turkish invasion. The first three 
applications were made, for procedural reasons, not to the European Court, but to the 
European Commission of Human Rights instead. While the Commission had decided in 
favour of Cyprus, its decisions – unlike those of the Court – were not legally binding. The 
fourth inter-state application therefore, was a strategic and well-calculated decision on behalf 
of the government to invest further state resources and risk a negative outcome in the Court 
in order to express in an even more authoritative forum its grievances against Turkey. This is 
evidence of the RoC’s belief that a favourable judicial pronouncement could further 
legitimise its historical claims.   
 
	 4 
The ECtHR is not the only international forum that Cyprus has approached in order to 
confirm the illegality of the Turkish invasion and its aftermath. There are also UN General 
Assembly resolutions urging the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Cyprus,11 UN 
Security Council resolutions condemning Turkey’s recognition of the ‘Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus’12 and recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee of the Council of 
Europe expressing concern about the transfer of Turkish settlers in the north of Cyprus 
(Parliamentary Assembly, 2003). These resolutions, lobbied for by RoC officials, confirm the 
existence of a consistent belief among GC policy makers that pronouncements by 
international organisations are an effective way of recording the consequences of the military 
invasion and ongoing occupation and establishing an official narrative. The state’s use of the 
law to make its historical claims even more authoritative is further illustrated by the decision 
of the Republic to become involved as an intervening party in cases brought to the ECtHR 
against Turkey by individual applicants. The most well-known individual application is 
Loizidou v. Turkey, in which the ECtHR held for the first time that the continuing prohibition 
of the applicant by Turkish troops to access her property in the occupied part of Cyprus 
resulted in a violation of her right to property (Loizidou, 1997). 
 
Both in Loizidou and Cyprus v. Turkey, the applicants faced formidable procedural hurdles in 
convincing the ECtHR to hear their complaints. For instance, it was necessary to respond to 
Turkey’s argument that it could only be responsible for human rights violations that took 
place within its own territory. Since in these cases the alleged violations took place in 
Cyprus, Turkey submitted that either the RoC or the unrecognised ‘Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus’ should remedy them (Cyprus, 2002, para. 69). Moreover, the applicants’ 
lawyers had to address Turkey’s argument that it could not be liable for alleged violations 
that took place in 1974, since the Court only had jurisdiction to hear cases against it for 
events that occurred from 1990 onwards (Loizidou, 1997, para. 41). The RoC, directly in the 
inter-state case and as an intervening party in Loizidou, successfully responded to both of 
these procedural hurdles and broke new legal ground in the process. The complexity of the 
legal arguments made in the two cases, together with the immense amount of information that 
had to be gathered in order to prove the substantive allegations, illustrate the professionalism 
and commitment with which the state approached the exercise of recording the history of the 
invasion in a court of law.  
 
Like the invasion, the government’s response to the coup has been to turn to the law. Thus, in 
1977, the executive prosecuted and the judiciary eventually convicted Nikolaos Sampson, the 
man who replaced the legitimate President during the 8-day duration of the coup (Sampson, 
1977). On the one hand, Sampson’s punishment and the Supreme Court’s declaration that the 
actions of the illegitimate government had no legal effect, could be seen as an effective 
response to the coup by the state, comparable to the RoC’s submissions in the ECtHR cases. 
On the other, the decision to prosecute just a single individual, implicitly sent the message 
that there was no one else to blame for the coup. By punishing only Sampson, other GC, who 
either knew about or supported the coup, were exonerated (Karstedt, 2009, p. 1). 13  An 
additional problem with this prosecution concerns the historical fact, which was discussed by 
the Supreme Court in the case itself, that while Sampson was involved in the coup, he was 
not the mastermind behind it.14  This consideration is arguably reflected in the fact that 
Sampson only served approximately six years out of his 20-year sentence (Lewis, 2001). The 
ambivalence of the state through its judicial and executive branches to punish Sampson is 
reflected today in the public’s perception of his person. While some GC remember and 
condemn his actions and those of the organisation he represented, most have either simply 
forgotten about him or excuse his activities by portraying him as a misguided puppet of the 
	 5 
Greek junta government. Most problematic, is the small but vocal part of GC society which 
views Sampson as an unsung national hero. The existence of such views among the public 
can partly be attributed to the state’s reluctance to condemn in the clearest terms the 
organised attack against it sovereignty.  
 
This reluctance is also reflected in the lukewarm stance the state adopted against 62 identified 
putschists. Originally the government had reacted to the coup by passing a series of laws that 
were intended to identify, investigate and put on trial those who had actively contributed to 
it.15 However, due to significant delays in their implementation, which themselves point to 
the state’s reluctance to punish the perpetrators, an additional law was passed which 
empowered the executive through the Council of Ministers to terminate the employment of 
civil servants who were believed to have been actively involved in the coup.16 Using this law, 
and relying on an administrative process (instead of a trial) that suffered from significant 
procedural limitations, the Council dismissed 62 civil servants (Anastasiades, 1988). It is not 
clear what evidence the Council relied on in order to identify the 62 and whether there were 
others in the civil service who were also involved in the coup. Moreover, since the law 
empowered the Council to dismiss only civil servants, no action was taken against putschists 
who were working in the private sector. Most problematically, the 62 were not put on trial 
and were not given the opportunity to present evidence to the Council of Ministers in their 
defence. Despite these serious deficiencies, the Supreme Court ruled in Christodoulides 
(1983) that the Council of Ministers’ decision to terminate the services of the 62 was done for 
public interest reasons, rather than in order to punish them. Since the dismissals were not the 
results of disciplinary proceedings, the Court was able to gloss over the lack of procedural 
safeguards and argue that it was not necessary to comply with these in the first place.  
 
The RoC’s decision to empower the Council of Ministers, rather than the judiciary, to punish 
the putschists resulted in three problems, which directly affected the way in which the coup is 
remembered by the GC public. The first problem was that the administrative process 
followed by the Council, which fell far below any fair trial requirements, made it necessary to 
label the dismissals as public interest decisions. While this served as a useful shortcut since it 
allowed the government to act quickly, it failed to send the message that the putschists’ 
actions were deplorable and in need of punishment. In fact, one could argue that since the 
very premise of the Court’s decision was that the dismissals were not the result of 
disciplinary proceedings, the 62 had done nothing wrong or worth disciplining. As a result, 
this could be perceived as a message from the state that the actions of the putschists were not 
blameworthy enough to deserve the censure of the law through criminal proceedings. The 
second immediate problem with the decision was that failing to rely on normal criminal 
proceedings was to the detriment of individual justice for the 62. In turn, this made it both 
possible and plausible for them to argue that the government was so determined to punish 
someone for the coup that it scapegoated them in the process. In the end, the lack of 
transparency that characterised the Council’s proceedings made it difficult to determine 
whether such allegations were true or not and clouded the contribution they could have made 
to an accurate historical account of what happened and who was to blame for the coup.17 
Scapegoating defendants is a danger that exists whenever alleged perpetrators are punished 
for a historical wrong, but it is particularly serious when minimum fair trial requirements 
have not been met (Buruma, 1995, p. 142; Koskienniemi, 2002).18 
 
The third problem with the state’s decision to rely on administrative, rather than judicial 
procedures, was that it encouraged a range of ill-suited government bodies to take justice in 
their own hands. Illustrative of this are the decisions of the Educational Service Committee 
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(Mylonas, 1982) and a local Bar Commission (In re X Y, 1981) to discipline respectively a 
headteacher and a lawyer who had been allegedly involved in the coup. The state’s decision 
to rely on an administrative process, which was by its nature less likely to capture the 
public’s attention than a high profile legal case, undermined from the very start the objective 
of sending a message of condemnation against the coup. However, this became even harder 
to achieve when obscure bodies like a Bar Commission, the very existence of which is often 
unknown to the general public, took the unilateral initiative of punishing the putschists. 
Moreover, since it was never these bodies’ job to punish their members for such offences, 
they lacked the appropriate procedural safeguards to hear the allegations, which in turn, 
undermined the legitimacy of their decisions and made their findings vulnerable to attack. 
Thus, the method that the state decided to use when responding to the coup – namely, relying 
on an administrative rather than a judicial process, which had an ad hoc, untransparent and 
decentralized nature – directly affected how this historical event has been recalled by the GC 
population at large.   
 
Less than 10 years after Christodoulides, the case that confirmed the constitutionality of the 
Council of Ministers’ decision to dismiss the putschists, a differently composed Council of 
Ministers revoked the dismissals of the 62 and asked them to return to their positions in the 
civil service.19 In response, a month later, the House of Representatives passed a law which 
annulled the new Council of Ministers decision and amended the state budget in order to 
prevent the payment of the 62’s salaries. This law was challenged in President of the 
Republic v. House of Representatives in which the majority of a divided court held, contrary 
to Christodoulides, that the law preventing the 62 to return to their posts was 
unconstitutional. Thus, even as late as 1994, and in stark contrast to the unanimously 
supported efforts that were simultaneously taking place at the ECtHR in relation to the 
Turkish invasion, the political and legal elite of the country remained divided in its response 
to the coup. As a result, the only clear message sent to the public was that the state was 
unwilling to unequivocally condemn the illegal acts of the putschists and punish them in a 
paradigmatic and meaningful way.  
 
 
4. The reasons behind the selective amnesia 
 
At least to some extent, the varied remembrance of the historical wrongs of 1974 among the 
GC community is state-sanctioned: it has been caused, both by the different legal treatment 
the two have received and by the way the legal sources relating to each have been used by 
state organs and broader society since then. The reason the state has taken an interest in 
shaping the way these historical events are remembered is because this suits its two main 
political objectives. First, it is in the RoC’s interests to preserve and build unity among its 
population. The ambivalence in the state’s response to the coup, stems from a legitimate 
disagreement between the political parties as to whether this objective is best addressed by 
forgetting about the divisive coup and moving on or by directly acknowledging and 
addressing the harm that has been done to the coup’s victims.20 Conversely, the ECtHR case 
law against Turkey has received so much attention and support because the political parties 
agree that one of the best ways to unite the GC public is by creating a common external 
enemy. Second, since the Republic’s objective is to negotiate a settlement to the Cyprus 
problem that undoes the effects of the Turkish invasion as much as possible, it is in its 
interests to present GC as being exclusively the victims of belligerent actions. 21  An 
acceptance of this narrative makes it easier to argue that the international community should 
push Turkey to adopt a more compromising stance on the negotiating table. The RoC has 
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projected the ECtHR case law to such an extent precisely because it contributes to the 
building of this narrative (Christophorou, 2010, p. 64 and 83). Conversely, since the 
administrative and judicial decisions concerning the coup paint a more nuanced picture, with 
some GC being both victims and perpetrators of actions that took place in 1974, it has been 
in the interests of the state to ignore them.  
 
At the same time however, it is also conceivable that factors that were beyond the state’s 
control have also affected the extent and way in which the legal cases and the events relating 
to them are remembered. One such factor concerns the fact that the invasion cases were 
litigated at the ECtHR, while the coup was addressed by the Cypriot judiciary and 
administrative bodies.22 This difference between the organs dealing with the two events has 
influenced the way each is remembered in two ways. On the one hand, the international 
presence of the ECtHR has given its decisions greater legitimacy and visibility than those of 
the Supreme Court. Both Loizidou and Cyprus v. Turkey were heard and decided by the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court. The success of the applicants to convince this 
international and impartial group of judges, rather than any domestic decision-maker, that 
Turkey was responsible for human rights violations in Cyprus added legitimacy and 
persuasiveness to their complaints. Moreover, the fact that this decision was delivered in 
Strasbourg and was communicated, through the different mechanisms of the Council of 
Europe, to all the member states of the organisation, gave it a lot more visibility than any 
domestic judgment could have received. Conversely, Sampson’s prosecution was a much 
more discrete state of affairs and the punishment of the 62 putschists through administrative 
action even more quiet still. As Mark Osiel (1995-1996, p. 505) argues, in order for a legal 
case to make history, the hearings must capture the public’s attention. Arguably, it was much 
easier to achieve this through the prominent stage provided by the ECtHR, rather than in the 
more humble setting of the domestic courts and administrative organs.  
 
On the other hand, the different rules of procedure in domestic and international bodies have 
determined who can be brought to justice as the alleged wrongdoer in each case. Since the 
ECtHR is an international court, the respondent to any allegations of wrongdoing had to be 
the state of Turkey itself. Conversely, dealing with the coup through Cyprus’ criminal and 
administrative law systems meant that only individual defendants could be brought to justice. 
Thus, the litigation of the two events in different courts sent varying messages about the 
status of the perpetrator and the seriousness of the wrongdoing in each case: since the 
respondent in the ECtHR cases was the state, the invasion and its consequences were 
understood as the responsibility of Turkey and were therefore more easily perceived as a 
well-coordinated and deliberate attack from one country against another. Opposing this, by 
only prosecuting Sampson, it became possible to present the coup as an instance of one 
person breaking the law, rather than as another orchestrated threat to the sovereignty of the 
Republic. In turn, the collectivisation of the blame in the case of the invasion and its 
individualisation in that of the coup, affected the seriousness of each crime in the eyes of the 





The two sets of legal responses that have been explored here are not always easy to compare: 
the cases concerning the invasion were litigated in an international court during the 1990s 
and 2000s, while those dealing with the coup were the outcomes of domestic bodies in the 
1970s until the 1990s. Yet, the attitudes of the GC political elite that the two sets of cases 
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reflect have been consistent over the years: while RoC representatives have been shouting 
loudly and clearly (both during and after the adjudication of the cases) that the Turkish 
invasion is an illegal foreign attack on Cyprus, they have been mostly silent about the attack 
to the government that came from within. It is partly as a result of this, that the GC public is 
suffering from a type of selective amnesia about one of the two historical wrongs of 1974.  
 
The purpose of this chapter has not been to criticise the RoC’s attempts to condemn the 
invasion by applying to the ECtHR. Despite limitations in the process, it has also not been the 
intention to criticise the Republic’s response to the coup. Especially the latter needs to be 
seen in light of the context that prevailed at the time, with GC being deeply divided among 
themselves and in urgent need to rebuild their country following the catastrophic Turkish 
invasion. Rather, the objective of this chapter has been to illustrate that decisions of the 
government to use the law in a particular way can significantly affect how given historical 
events are remembered by the population at large. Whether a historical event is subject to a 
judicial or administrative process and whether that takes place on the international or 
domestic plane can have a sizable impact on the establishment of a well-remembered official 
narrative. At the same time, it is necessary to acknowledge that it is not only the legal or 
administrative processes that are important, but also how these are subsequently utilized by 
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